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THE SEC's RULE

206(4)-8: Two

STEPS

BACK AND ONE STEP FORWARD

"Without a private right of action, the only true barometer for
successful hedge fund regulation will be the transparency that it
mandates."I

I. INTRODUCTION

Over the last ten years, the landscape of the U.S. financial markets
has changed drastically, and not necessarily for the better. The most
predominant feature of this change is attributable to the massive
growth of hedge funds. 2 Investors of all types are dumping their assets
into hedge funds, attempting to capitalize on the potentially
astronomical gains hedge funds offer.3 As a result, hedge fundsunder-regulated, risky, and all too available-are now controlling over
$1 trillion in assets. 4 The problem with hedge funds managing such a
1. Randall Steinmeyer, Director, the Hedge Fund Association; Of Counsel,
Murray, Frank & Sailer LLP; Formerly Partner: Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman &
Robbins LLP, Lerach Coughlin Stoia & Robbins LLP, Milberg Weiss LLP.
2. See infra Part II.B (discussing the recent growth of hedge funds).
3. See Melissa Antoszewski, Las Vegas Style Investing: In the Absence of
Regulation, Risky Hedge Fund Bets Can Win Big and Lose Even More, 8
TRANSACTIONS TENN. J. Bus. L. 381, 381 (2007) (stating that the growth of hedge
funds is fueled by investors "who hope to receive high returns"); Sargon Daniel,
Hedge Fund Registration: Yesterday's Regulatory Schemes for Today's Investment
Vehicles, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 247, 256-57 (discussing how investors came to
expect very high returns after the stock market boom in the 1990s, and sought after
those returns through hedge funds); Jessica Natali, Trimming the Hedges Is a
Difficult Task: The SEC's Attempt to Regulate Hedge Funds Falls Short of
Expectations, 15 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 113, 114 (2006) ("With seemingly
illustrious returns over the past several years, many government officials and
agencies believe that hedge funds have positioned themselves as the paradigm of
investment instrumentality.").
4. Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 385 ("Total assets under management topped
1.2 trillion dollars in 2006 .... "); see infra Part Il.C (discussing the SEC's concerns
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large sum of money is the potentially devastating effect that their
failure could have on U.S. financial markets and individual investors.
Just one or two major hedge funds failing could have severe
ramifications for the world's financial markets, and could force the
U.S. economy into a recession.5 Moreover, many large institutional
charitable
and
universities,
pensions,
investors-including
6
funds.
hedge
in
investing
by
millions
organizations-risk losing
Notwithstanding the hedge fund industry's powerful influence
over individual investors and financial markets the world over, most
hedge funds avoid any kind of regulation by taking advantage of
certain exemptions provided for by U.S. securities laws.7
Consequently, in 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) adopted the Hedge Fund Rule, which would have closed a
major exemption available to hedge funds and required registration of
most hedge fund advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(IAA).8 However, shortly after this promising law was adopted, it was
vacated by the United States Court of Appeals in the District of
Columbia. 9 The court in Goldstein v. SEC held that the rule was
arbitrary and unreasonable, and concluded that the SEC had failed to
justify its adoption.' 0 Following the rule's defeat in Goldstein,"] it

with the recent hedge fund growth).
5. See Daniel, supra note 3, at 296 ("The sheer amount of capital under
management and the ability for those managers to stake positions that have
potentially harsh effects on the national and global economies provide strong
arguments for imposing regulation."); see also infra Part II.C (discussing concerns
regarding hedge fund growth, including its potential to disrupt the world's financial
markets).
6. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing generally that institutional investors are
beginning to increase investments into hedge funds); see also infra note 97 and
accompanying text (commenting on how a San Diego county pension plan recently
lost approximately $175 million due to the collapse of Amaranth Advisors, LLC).
7. See infra Part II.A (describing how hedge funds take advantage of various
exemptions in the securities laws).
8. See infra Part III.C (providing a general overview of the Hedge Fund Rule).
9. See infra Part IV (discussing the D.C. Circuit's rejection of the Hedge Fund
Rule).
10. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 880-84 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
11. See BARRY P. BARBASH & ERIC C. GOLDSTEIN, The SEC and Hedge
Funds: A Continuing Regulatory Saga, in PRACTISING LAW INST., CORPORATE LAW
AND PRACTICE 237, 239 (2007) (stating that the D.C. Circuit's decision was a
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appeared that the SEC was faced with two options for re-addressing
its concerns regarding hedge funds: appeal the court's decision or
rewrite the IAA hedge fund rule. 12 However, in late 2006, the
Commission elected to pursue a third alternative: propose and adopt a
new antifraud rule under Section 206(4) of the IAA. 13 Purportedly, the
new rule is intended to clarify the SEC's authority to bring
enforcement actions against hedge fund advisers for fraudulent
activity towards any of the fund's individual investors.' 4 Further, the
rule broadens the definition of fraud to a negligence standard,15 and
holds even unregistered hedge fund advisers liable for fraudulent
practices. 16
The adoption of Rule 206(4)-8 is a step in the right direction
towards hedge fund regulation. However, in adopting the new rule, the
Commission fails to address many, if not most, of its concerns

"stinging defeat for the SEC").
12. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 21.2[3] (5th
ed. 2005 & Supp. 2008) (stating that, at the time of the Goldstein decision, "[i]t was
not [] clear whether the SEC [would] appeal the decision or rewrite the rule").
13. See id ("[I]n December 2006, the Commission proposed an antifraud rule
aimed at hedge funds ....
").
14. See infra Part V (providing a detailed overview of Rule 206(4)-8). See
generally Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles,
72 Fed. Reg. 44,756 (Aug. 9, 2007) (describing and adopting Rule 206(4)-8).
15. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles,
72 Fed. Reg. at 44,759. The new rule effectively broadens fraud to a negligence
standard by eliminating scienter as a prerequisite to finding fraud. Id. The "scienter"
requirement is not discussed at length in this Comment. The Supreme Court has
generally defined scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12
(1976). However, in some circumstances, the scienter standard requires less than the
intent to deceive. See id. For example, recklessness may be considered sufficient to
show scienter. Id.The requirements for showing scienter under Rule lOb-5 have not
been clearly established, and are subject to some dispute. See Kurtis A. Kemper,
Annotation, What Constitutes Recklessness Sufficient to Show Necessary Element of
Scienter in Civil Action for Damages Under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b)) and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 49 A.L.R. FED. 392, § 2 (1980) ("[A] number of courts [have
interpreted] Ernst & Ernst as leaving open the possibility that reckless conduct may
satisfy the scienter requirement ....); see also infra Part V.F.
16. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles,
72 Fed. Reg. at 44,758.
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regarding hedge funds-concerns the Commission previously raised
when it adopted the now-vacated Hedge Fund Rule. The new rule may
be a small, measured step towards the ultimate goal of regulation, but
it falls short of the vacated Hedge Fund Rule's, if not the
Commission's, ultimate goals of providing security in U.S. financial
markets and protecting the individual investors within these markets
from the potentially devastating impact that unregulated hedge funds
can have. Primarily, the new antifraud rule fails to provide a mandate
or an incentive for hedge funds to register under the IAA. As will be
discussed, registration of all hedge funds is necessary before any
specific rule or regulation can be enforced as a preventative measure.
How can the SEC monitor and detect fraud over unregistered and,
consequently, unknown advisers?' 7 Moreover, registration alone,
without the newly broadened definition of fraud, would, at a
minimum, be a viable deterrent of fraud, which is the primary reason
18
the Commission adopted the new antifraud rule in the first place.
Accordingly, the SEC should re-focus its regulatory efforts on
providing transparency within the hedge fund industry by
implementing rules that either mandate the registration of hedge fund
advisers, or, at a minimum, create certain incentives for hedge fund
advisers to register.
This Comment explores the SEC's recent endeavor to regulate the
explosive hedge fund industry. In so doing, it explores the history and
current state of the hedge fund industry, including the Commission's
fears regarding systematic risk and investor protection. Further, this
Comment examines the SEC's attempt at regulation through the
Hedge Fund Rule, the Goldstein decision to vacate that rule, and the
SEC's disparate, if not desperate, response in adopting Rule 206(4)-8.
Part II begins with an overview of the hedge fund industry's massive
growth during the last decade and explores growing concerns within
the hedge fund industry. This includes a discussion of several of the
17. As will be discussed, holding unregistered investment advisers liable under
the new antifraud provision is ineffective. It is improbable that the Commission has

any information about the activities and operations of unregistered advisers because
they are not registered. Therefore, considering this lack of information, it would be
difficult to detect any fraudulent activity. See infra Part VI.A.
18. See infra Part VI.C (discussing how registration alone would be the most
viable solution to the SEC's concerns regarding both registered and unregistered
hedge funds).
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SEC's specific concerns, as well as a brief summary of the two largest
hedge fund failures to date. Part III provides a history and overview of
the IAA and gives an explanation of the vacated 2004 Hedge Fund
Rule. Part IV summarizes the Goldstein opinion and the reasons the
court ruled to vacate the Hedge Fund Rule. Part V deconstructs and
explains the SEC's new Rule 206(4)-8, which was adopted in
response to Goldstein. Part VI argues that the new rule does not
satisfy the current need for hedge fund regulation because it fails to
address several of the concerns the SEC used to justify its initial
adoption of the Hedge Fund Rule. Additionally, Part VI proposes the
idea that the registration of hedge funds is an optimal solution to the
Commission's concerns with hedge fund regulation because
registration provides transparency, a necessary element to the
operation of healthy financial markets. Finally, Part VII concludes by
suggesting that any new regulatory actions should be focused on
increasing the transparency of the hedge fund industry through the
registration of all hedge funds.
II. THE RISE OF HEDGE FUNDS AND THE NEW CONCERNS REGARDING
INVESTOR SAFETY AND MARKET SECURITY

A. What Is a Hedge Fund?
A hedge fund is difficult, if not impossible, to precisely and
exclusively define.1 9 Further, hedge funds have not yet been defined in
any securities laws.2 Some have cynically described hedge funds as
"'shadowy'
investment vehicles that 'escape'
regulation by
'exploiting loopholes' in federal securities laws ... ,,2 while others
have broadly defined them as "'any pooled investment vehicle that is
privately organized, administered by professional investment

19. Daniel, supra note 3, at 251. A hedge fund has no legal definition. Id. Even
the SEC has trouble defining the term exactly, admitting that they have no precise
definition. Id. Therefore, the only way to really define a hedge fund is by explaining
the fund's characteristics. Id.
20. Id.; Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 382 ("Thus, there is no universal
definition to describe the various types of hedge funds.").
21. Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's
Regulatory Philosophy,Style, andMission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 979.
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managers, and not widely available to the public.' 22 Whatever one's
chosen definition, hedge funds may be defined by several universal
characteristics. 23 Hedge funds hold pools of securities and other assets
with the ultimate goal of generating positive returns for the fund's
investors. 24 Most importantly, hedge funds avoid registration under
several of the main securities acts, including the Securities Act of
1933,25 the Investment Company Act of 1940,26 and the Investment

22. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing PRESIDENT'S
WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF
LONG-TERM
CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT
1
(1999),
available
at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reportsihedgfund.pdf [hereinafter WORKING
GROUP]); see also Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 383 (describing the term "hedge
fund" as "a catchall classification for a number of privately-managed pools of
capital that are not registered .... ). It should be noted that the "aura of secrecy and
mystique" surrounding hedge funds may be seeded in the "rules of decades past
[requiring these funds] not to advertise or publicly solicit investors . . . ." Hedge
Funds' Notoriety: Fact or Fiction?, CHARTERED FIN. ANALYST, Feb. 2004, at 68-69.
23. Daniel, supra note 3, at 251 (stating that the easiest way to define a hedge
fund is to explain its uniform characteristics).
24. See Div. OF INV. MGMT. ET AL., SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF
HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, at ix (2003) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT]; Paredes, supra note 21, at

981-82 (describing hedge funds as investment vehicles that "maximize risk-adjusted
returns for investors .... ").
25. See Daniel, supra note 3, at 258 (discussing how hedge funds use a
"private offering exemption" to avoid registration under The Securities Act of
1933). Hedge funds avoid registering their securities under the Act by only offering
their services to accredited (pre-approved) investors and not to the general public.
Id. at 258-59.
26. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 875; STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at viii. An
exemption from the Investment Company Act allows hedge funds to participate in
activities that would otherwise be restricted to investment companies, such as
mutual funds, which must register under the Act. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 875. These
otherwise-restricted investing behaviors include trading on margin, engaging in
short sales, and not having to gain shareholder approval to take on debt or invest in
certain assets. Id. These otherwise-restricted investing behaviors are essential
elements of a hedge fund's operation. Id. Consequently, taking advantage of these
exemptions affords hedge funds the flexibility and freedom to be very aggressive in
their investment strategies because they do not have the same requirements and
restrictions that registered funds have, such as diversification requirements and
restrictions on leveraging (investing with borrowed money). See Daniel, supra note
3, at 252.
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Advisers Act of 1940.27 These funds avoid registration by flexibly
operating within certain exemptions under each act. 28 Taking
advantage of these exemptions allows hedge funds the freedom to
employ investment techniques, such as excessive leveraging and short
selling-techniques that are otherwise prohibited to registered
companies and advisers. 29 Also, an unregistered hedge fund can
seriously limit its disclosures by withholding information relating to
its investment strategies from regulators and from the fund's
investors. 30 The combination of unregulated investing activities,
specifically over-leveraging, and the lack of transparency into hedge
funds' positions and trading techniques caused several of the largest
fund failures in history-failures that came close to substantially
31
disturbing the world's financial markets.
27. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876. For information on the IAA, see infra Part III.
Although hedge funds take advantage of all the mentioned exemptions, this
Comment focuses primarily on the "private adviser exemption" of the IAA. See
discussion infra Part III. The SEC first attempted to increase regulation by creating a
new rule, the Hedge Fund Rule, which had the effect of re-defining the language of
the "private adviser exemption" to encompass almost every hedge fund adviser. Id.
However, their attempt failed in that the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of
Columbia, vacated the rule. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 884. The SEC's response was
Rule 206(4)-8, which is explained and critiqued in Part V of this Comment.
28. Natali, supra note 3, at 116 ("Hedge fund advisors ... have the flexibility
to structure their securities offerings in ways that qualify [them] for exemption from
all relevant federal securities laws."); see also Hedge Funds' Notoriety: Fact or
Fiction?, supra note 22, at 68 (discussing how the first hedge fund was formed as a
private limited partnership because that was the only available legal vehicle under
the restrictive federal securities laws).
29. Natali, supra note 3, at 116 ("[H]edge funds are not subject to the
diversification requirements or borrowing and leverage restrictions with which other
registered investment companies must comply."); see Daniel, supra note 3, at 252
("[H]edge funds are not limited by the restrictions on mutual funds, such as
diversification requirements and the inability to short-sell."). As far as a hedge
fund's investment strategies are concerned, this Comment, concerned primarily with
the new antifraud provision, only briefly delves into the use of extensive leveraging
and short selling. However, hedge fund investing strategies can be very complex and
may include "convertible arbitrage, emerging markets, long/short equity, eventdriven, fixed income, global macro, managed futures, market neutral, and short
biased." Paredes, supra note 21, at 982.
30. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 875 ("[H]edge funds typically remain secretive
about their positions and strategies, even to their own investors.").
31. See discussion infra Part II.D (providing two examples of when major
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B. The Growth of Hedge Funds in the Last Decade
The first hedge fund was created in 1949 by Alfred Winslow
Jones, who concentrated primarily on hedging the fund's exposure to
the market through investing practices based on long and short
positions, as well as leveraging. 32 Since 1949, hedge funds have
grown dramatically, especially in the last decade, and now comprise a
significant portion of the financial services landscape. 33 However,
precise numbers on exactly how fast hedge funds have grown or their
current status in the securities markets are difficult to attain; the SEC
has no way of monitoring many of these funds because they avoid
registration by exploiting exemptions under the IAA.34 Hedge funds
have grown from only 1100 funds managing approximately $50
billion in 199335 to over 7500 hedge funds managing approximately
$1.6 trillion in assets in 2007, the equivalent of 10% of the New York
Stock Exchange's total value. 36 Further, hedge funds achieved a
growth rate of 20% per year during this period, with individual funds
more than quadrupling in size. 37 Estimates suggest that from 1999 to
hedge funds have failed and the effects of their failure).
32. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 3; Daniel, supra note 3, at 253-54
(discussing the creation and growth of hedge funds); Hedge Funds' Notoriety: Fact
or Fiction?,supra note 22, at 68 ("The first hedge fund ... was a simple long-short
fund, but it was revolutionary."). Although hedge funds have technically been in
existence since 1949, this Comment focuses on their growth in the last decade or so,
from approximately 1993 to 2006.
33. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,055 (Dec. 10, 2004).
34. See id.
35. Paredes, supra note 21, at 982-83.
36. Kevin G. Hall & Robert A. Rankin, Hedge Funds May Pose a Risk to U.S.
Economy, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS,
Aug. 8,
2007, available at
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/18766.html ("Some 7,500 hedge funds
controlled $1.6 trillion in assets as of the end of June [2007]. That's equal to about
10 percent of the total value of the New York Stock Exchange.").
37. ISAAC RUIZ-CARUS ET AL., WHAT Is A HEDGE FUND?, § 1.3,
http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/faq/Hedge.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) (stating
that the hedge fund industry is growing approximately 20% annually). The claim
that hedge funds have more than quadrupled in size is based on simple arithmetic by
the author, based on the average size of a hedge fund being approximately $45.5
million ($50 billion divided by 1100 funds) in 1993 and $213.3 million ($1.6 trillion
divided by 7500 funds) in 2007. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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2004 alone, hedge funds grew approximately 260%.38 Clearly, hedge
funds, and their investment advisers, are becoming "significant
players" in U.S. financial markets. 39 The industry's massive growth
and, consequently, the hedge fund's ability to adversely impact the
world's financial markets, have not gone unnoticed by regulators.4 °
C. The SEC's Growing Concerns Regarding Hedge Funds
The rapid growth of hedge funds and their increasingly large share
of the U.S. market's managed assets have amplified the SEC's
apprehension towards investor safety and market stability. 4 ' Until
recently, the SEC was not troubled with hedge funds taking advantage
of exemptions provided for by securities laws because hedge funds
were considered exclusive investment vehicles offered privately only
to "sophisticated investors. 4 2 Traditionally, the SEC did not consider
investment vehicles with those characteristics dangerous to securities
markets or to the average investor.4 3 However, three recent trends
have raised the SEC's concern, including the growth of hedge funds
within U.S. financial markets, increased fraudulent activity in an
44
under-regulated industry, and the retailization of hedge funds.

38. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. at 72,055.
39. See id. at 72,056 ("[H]edge fund advisers have become significant
participants in the securities markets, both as managers of assets and traders of
securities.").
40. See infra Part II.C.
41. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. at 72,055; Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 391 ("[R]isky bets by [hedge]
fund managers have far-reaching implications for both investors and financial
markets."); Paredes, supra note 2 1, at 983.
42. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
43. See id
44. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. at 72,055; Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 391 ("[H]edge funds raise a
number of important policy concerns, including the potential for fraud, retailization,
and serious market disruptions.").
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1. A Growing Share of the U.S. Markets and Systematic Risk
First, and most importantly, the SEC is troubled by the rapid
growth of hedge funds in recent years and the industry's increasing
share of trading volume in U.S. markets. 45 This growth in trading
volume has created apprehension among regulators due to increased
systematic risk, that is, the hedge fund industry's growing capability
to negatively impact the health of U.S. financial markets. 6 Currently,
hedge funds have "enormous influence in the marketplace,"

accounting for approximately 30% of all equity trading in U.S.
markets, 4 7 and nearly 50% of all trading in the world's major financial
markets.48 Also, hedge funds can hold significant portions of specific
market segments, such that a fund's failure could seriously derail that
segment. 4 9 The extent to which risky and over-leveraged hedge funds
can affect the-market is unknown, 50 but just a single collapse could be
"devastating."'"' Furthermore, the threats that hedge funds pose go

45. Reg;strafton Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. at 72,055; see also Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 395 (discussing how the
hedge fund industry's enormous influence and risky investment techniques expose
financial markets to potentially huge losses).
46. See Paredes, supra note 21, at 983 ("The dramatic growth of the hedge
fund industry has fueled concerns about so-called 'systematic risk,' which goes to
the safety and soundness of financial markets."). Systematic risk is "the potential for
a modest economic shock to induce substantial volatility in asset prices, significant
reductions in corporate liquidity, potential bankruptcies and efficiency losses." Id.
(citing Paul Kupiec & David Nickerson, Assessing Systemic Risk Exposure from
Banks and GSEs Under Alternative Approaches to CapitalRegulation, 48 J. REAL
EST. FIN. & ECON. 123, 123 (2004)). Specifically, systematic risk becomes a concern
"when leading financial institutions are exposed to highly leveraged hedge
funds ... " Id. at 999. Moreover, concern regarding systematic risk is amplified by
the fact that hedge funds, their investors, and the institutions that finance hedge
funds "focus on the private benefits and costs of the transactions, not the social cost
of greater leverage or speculation in the financial system as a whole." Id.
47. Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 394-95.
48. Paredes, supra note 21, at 986. Furthermore, hedge funds "account for over
70% of daily activity in the convertibles market, the U.S. distressed debt market, and
the U.S. exchange-traded fund market." Id.
49. Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 395.
50. See Hall & Rankin, supra note 36.
51. Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 395 ("Many analysts are concerned that
these practices may cause widespread systematic losses to other firms, which will
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beyond Wall Street. For instance, hedge funds have the potential to
shake the economy by distressing large commercial banks.5 2 These
funds leverage their risky investments by borrowing, on margin, large
amounts of money from these banks.53 When hedge funds fail, the
banking industry becomes vulnerable because banks are not able to
collect on their loans.5 4 Though it is unclear as to the extent, a large
commercial bank's failure can have a significant adverse impact on
the economy.

55

2. FraudulentActivity
Second, the SEC is alarmed with the growing number of fraud
cases being brought against hedge fund advisers.56 From 2000 to
57
2004, the SEC brought fifty-one fraud cases worth over $1.1 billion.
The number of cases suggests that fraud by hedge fund advisers is a
include:
fraudulent
activities
prevalent
concern. 5 8 These
"misappropriation of assets; misrepresentation of portfolio
performance; falsification of experience, credentials and past returns;
misleading disclosure regarding claimed trading strategies; and
improper valuation of assets."59

disrupt global financial markets.... The consequences could be devastating, and the
fall of a single hedge fund could bring about an economic catastrophe.").
52. See Hall & Rankin, supra note 36 (discussing how hedge funds not only
adversely affect Wall Street when they fail, but also other industries, including the
banking sector).
53. See id ("Much of what [hedge funds] own was bought with money they
borrowed from big banks, sometimes up to 80 percent of their holdings.").
54. Id.
55. Id. ("If the banks are in trouble, so is the economy. But nobody knows how
much trouble.").
56. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,056 (Dec. 10, 2004).
57. Id. ("In the last 5 years, the Commission has brought 51 cases in which we
have asserted that hedge fund advisers have defrauded hedge fund investors ... in
amounts our staff estimates to exceed $1.1 billion."). However, the SEC release fails
to provide any comparative figure for assertions of fraudulent activity prior to the
year 2000. See id
58. See id.; Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 391-93.
59. STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 73-74; Antoszewski, supra note.3, at 391.
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Although the most prevalent type of fraud is an investment
adviser defrauding the fund's own investors, there is a mounting
concern over the alarming rate at which hedge fund advisers have
been defrauding other financial entities in the markets. 60 Specifically,
hedge funds are linked to late trading and market timing scandals
which result in their earning money at the expense of mutual fund
investors. 61 Although this type of fraud may ultimately increase the
value of the hedge fund and thereby benefit the hedge fund's
investors, the negative impact it has on other unrelated market
participants, including mutual fund investors, is what concerns the
SEC. 62 In 2004 alone, an estimated 400 hedge funds and eighty-seven
hedge fund advisers were involved in this type of fraud, a statistic the
SEC finds disturbing.63 The SEC's concern is rooted in its
responsibility to find, punish and deter deceitful investment tactics
aimed at defrauding any investor, regardless of whether the investor is
market participant negatively
a hedge fund investor or an unrelated
64
affected by a hedge fund's activities.

60. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. at 72,056-57 ("[W]e now too frequently see instances in which hedge
funds have been used to defraud other markets participants. .

.

. [T]he frequency

with which hedge funds and their advisers appear in these cases and continue to turn
up in the investigations is alarming."); Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 392.
61. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. at 72,056-57 ("Many of our enforcement cases involved hedge fund
advisers that sought to exploit mutual fund investors for their funds' and their own
gain. Some... entered into arrangements with mutual fund advisers under which the
mutual fund advisers waived restrictions on market timing in return for receipt of the
hedge fund advisers' 'sticky assets,' i.e., placement of other assets of other funds
managed by the mutual fund adviser. Other hedge fund advisers sought ways to
avoid detection by mutual fund personnel by conspiring with intermediaries to
conceal the identity of their hedge funds."); Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 392.
62. The SEC's concern over fraud by an investment adviser extends to all
investors, not just those in the adviser's fund. See Registration Under the Advisers
Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72056-57.
63. Id.; Antoszewski, supranote 3, at 392.
64. See Paredes, supra note 21, at 1005 ("[F]ederal securities regulation is
primarily oriented toward investor protection in the sense of remedying information
asymmetries and rooting out fraud. The SEC, at both the commissioner and staff
levels, has long characterized itself as the investors' protector .... ").
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3. Retailization
Finally, the SEC is concerned with the "retailization" 65 of hedge
funds. 66 Retailization results in smaller, namely institutional, investors
gaining access to risky hedge fund investing. 67 This access to hedge
funds is fueled by three developments. First, although opposing
arguments may suggest otherwise, 6 8 hedge funds have become more
available to the average investor who is usually unfamiliar with the
fund's riskier investment behaviors. 69 Second, the growth of "funds of
hedge funds" is increasing the accessibility of hedge fund investing. y
65. Hedge fund "retailization" can be defined as "the increasing availability of
[hedge funds] and how and to whom they are available." Testimony Concerning
Investor Protection Implications of Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (2003) (statement of William H.
Donaldson, Chairman, SEC), available at http://edgar.sec.gov/news/testimony/
041003tswhd.htm.
66. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
67. See id.; Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund
Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,057-58.
68. See Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 393-94 ("[H]edge fund managers
continue to argue that they do not intend to solicit 'retail investors' because such
investors are not suited for the inherent risks of hedge funds .... ."); see also
Paredes, supra note 21, at 990 ("Although some evidence shows a modest
'retailization' of the hedge fund industry, the vast bulk of hedge fund investors can
protect themselves, at least insofar as the federal securities laws understand investor
self-protection.").
69. See Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 393 (stating that the decrease in
minimum investment requirements of hedge funds has increased the ability of less
"sophisticated" investors to enter the market). Access to hedge funds has
traditionally been limited to "high net worth individuals and families." STAFF
REPORT, supra note 24, at 43. Recently, hedge funds have been decreasing their
minimum requirements, allowing them to "attract individuals who meet the
monetary requirement, but who do 'not possess the understanding or market power'
to make an informed investment decision." Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 393 (citing
STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 81).
70. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. at 72,057 ("[T]he development of 'funds of hedge funds' has made hedge
funds more broadly available to investors ....
Funds of hedge funds today represent
approximately twenty percent of hedge fund capital, and are the fastest growing
source of capital for hedge funds today."). "Funds of hedge funds" are "pooled
funds that allocate their capital among several hedge funds, usually in the
neighborhood of 15 to 25 different hedge funds. Unlike the underlying hedge funds,
these vehicles are often registered with the SEC and promoted to individual
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Third, and most importantly, there have been an increasing number of
hedge fund investments by institutional investors who have
traditionally not invested in hedge funds.7 ' When an institutional
investor, such as a pension fund, invests in a hedge fund, it exposes
the institution and, consequently, the institution's millions of
beneficiaries to the inherent dangers and risks associated with hedge
funds-risks these types of investors and their beneficiaries may not
otherwise knowingly take. 72 However, some critics argue that these
institutional investors have sophisticated investment managers who
are able to recognize the risks of hedge fund investing. 73 However,
this argument fails to take into account that even the most experienced
investment manager is unable to make informed investment decisions
74
with the severe lack of transparency in this unregulated industry.
D. Examples of When Hedge Funds Fail
1. Long Term CapitalManagement
The SEC's concerns regarding hedge funds' potential to
systematically disrupt U.S. financial markets were realized with the
failure of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM).75 LTCM was a
hedge fund that managed more than $125 billion in 1998.76 LTCM

investors."

David

Harper,

Introduction

to

Hedge

Funds-Part

Two,

http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/121003.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
71. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. at 72,058. These institutional investors include pension funds, universities,
charitable organizations, endowments, and foundations. Id.
72. See id ("Losses resulting from hedge fund investing and hedge fund frauds
may affect the entities' ability to satisfy their obligations to their beneficiaries or
pursue other intended purposes.").
73. See, e.g., Natali, supra note 3, at 127-28 (stating that, despite the SEC's
concerns, "the SEC fails to take into consideration the experience and financial
sophistication of the investment managers employed by institutional investors").
74. Paredes, supra note 21, at 992 ("[E]ven sophisticated investors may not be
able to protect their own interests if they do not have the information they need or
want about the issuer or cannot feasibly understand it.").
75. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006). See generally
WORKING GROUP, supra note 22, at 10-21 (discussing the failure of LTCM and the
effects that it had on financial markets).
76. WORKING GROUP, supra note 22, at 12.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol44/iss2/7

14

Tierney: The SEC's Rule 206(4)-8: Two Steps Back and One Step Forward

2008]

THE

SEC's RULE 206(4)-8

603

used extremely complex investment strategies 77 to achieve nearly 40%
returns for investors. 78 The most dangerous of these investment
strategies was LTCM's derivatives positions which totaled
approximately $1.5 trillion, including complicated derivatives
products in Russian debt. 79 At the end of 1998, Russia suddenly
defaulted on that debt, 80 and LTCM became instantly liable for its
$1.5 trillion in positions. 81 Due to LTCM's major leveraging strategies
and derivative positions, the fund could not even come marginally
close to covering this figure. 82 In addition to the Russian default,
LTCM experienced other major financial downturns. 83 Consequently,
major market participants became concerned with LTCM's imminent
failure. 84 Specifically, "major banks and other creditors who enabled
LTCM to build up its leveraged positions were concerned about the
effect of a default on their operations." 85 Ultimately, the banks that
were intertwined with LTCM, together with the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, financially bailed LTCM out. 86 Despite the help,
77. Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 407 ("LTCM used a variety of trading
strategies including 'shorted' Treasure bond futures and high yielding 'mortgagebacked or corporate debt securities.' LTCM held large positions in various markets
and was extensively leveraged ...expos[ing] the fund to major market risks."
(citing Hedge Fund Gets Help, CNN MONEY.COM, Sept. 23, 1998,
http://money.cnn.com/1998/09/23/investing/longterm)). See Paredes, supra note 21,
at 985 (stating that "LTCM was extremely leveraged").
78. Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 407 (stating that LTCM was once considered
the "dream team" because of its success).
79. Daniel, supra note 3, at 267. These positions were "all legally taken and
supported by major financial institutions." Id.
80. Id.; Paredes, supra note 21, at 987 (stating that Russia unexpectedly
"devalued the ruble and declared a debt moratorium in 1998").
81. Daniel, supra note 3, at 267.
82. Id.; see also Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 407 ("LTCM could not continue
to meet its cash flow obligations to creditors because of its size and the leverage
involved.").
83. See Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 407 ("In 1998, the fund began
experiencing devastating financial hardships, with a loss of over fifty percent of its
equity."); Daniel, supra note 3, at 267.
84. Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 407 ("Market participants became concerned
about the possibility that LTCM would collapse ...."); see also Daniel, supra note

3, at 267 (stating that the U.S. government investigated LTCM's default).
85. Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 407.
86. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("[T]he Federal
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LTCM's investors were severely harmed.87 However, had the
government and the associated banks not acted, LTCM would have
failed, and the damage would have extended beyond LTCM's
investors; there would have been severe ramifications felt throughout
the world's capital markets.88
2. Amaranth Advisors
The failure of Amaranth Advisers, LLC (Amaranth) was the
largest fund failure in history. 89 During the first week of September
2006, Amaranth lost close to $5 billion due to a highly leveraged
investment strategy. 90 Amaranth's strategy included using large bank
loans and lines of credit to fund futures positions in natural gas, an
extremely risky and unpredictable commodity. 9' The natural gas
market was cooperative with Amaranth's investment techniques
92
during the first half of 2006, but suddenly shifted in September.

Reserve Bank of New York personally interveed to enginccr a bailout of the 'u-nd
in order to avoid a national financial crisis."). See Antoszewski, supra note 3, at
407-08 (discussing the agreement whereby the banks involved and the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York invested $3.6 billion into LTCM in exchange for a 90%
equity position in the fund).
87. Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 408.
88. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877 (stating that the bailout of LTCM was to
avoid a national financial crisis); Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 408 ("LTCM
avoided a major world financial crisis largely due to the assistance of other financial
institutions."); Daniel, supra note 3, at 267 ("[T]he default of LTCM... could have
derailed the entire world's financial markets ....
89. Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 410.
90. Id.at 409 (stating that Amaranth's $9 billion in assets fell to $4.5 billion);
see also Roger Ferguson & David Laster, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk, 10
BANQUE DE FR. FIN. STABILITY REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 45, 51 (2007), available at
http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/rsf/2007/etud5_0407.pdf
("Amaranth, a highly regarded USD 9 billion multi-strategy fund, recently lost 65%
of its assets in less than two weeks. The fund lost 35% of its value during the week
of 11 September 2006 ....
").
91. See Ferguson & Laster, supra note 90, at 51 (Amaranth "employ[ed] a
highly leveraged natural gas spread strategy"); Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 408
(describing Amaranth's financial positions as "risky bets in natural gas").
92. See Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 409 (stating that the fund was up
approximately $2 billion for the year by April 2006, but "[b]y September 2006, ...
the market quickly changed and gas prices fell drastically").
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Amaranth's investments in the commodity were so large and
concentrated that, when the market adversely shifted, it was unable to
get out of its positions. 93 Ultimately, Amaranth lost approximately
65% of its net asset value (NAV) in less than two weeks. 94 Despite the
severity of the fund's collapse, a large, systemic failure in the markets
was prevented with the help of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Citadel
Investment Group, LLC, who quickly and efficiently bought out
Amaranth's positions at a discount. 95 Moreover, Fortress Investment
Group LLC helped ease any market disruptions by allowing Amaranth
to sell off $3 billion in assets before Amaranth's clients could assert
their outstanding claims. 96 Although a major market disruption was
avoided with the help of J.P. Morgan, Citadel, and Fortress, the
thousands of unaware beneficiaries whose institutional investors had
invested in Amaranth-including beneficiaries of 3M Company's
pension fund and the San Diego County Employees Retirement
Association pension-suffered losses. 97 Ultimately, "Amaranth has
raised increased concerns regarding the trading practices of funds and

93. Id. See Ferguson & Laster, supra note 90, at 51 ("Amaranth tried
unsuccessfully to sell its positions .... ").
94. Ferguson & Laster, supra note 90, at 51; Antoszewski, supra note 3, at

409.
95. Ferguson & Laster, supra note 90, at 51 ("[Amaranth] sold its positions to
JP Morgan Chase and Citadel Investment Group at a USD 1.4 billion discount from
the prior day's market-to-market values."); see also Antoszewski, supra note 3, at
409-10 (commenting that the J.P. Morgan/Citadel buyout "eased concerns about
broad market turmoil and 'ripple effects' from the hedge fund's failure"); Edward
Pekarek, Pruning the Hedge: Who Is a "Client" and Whom Does an Adviser
Advise?, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 913, 962 (2007) (commenting on how the
"market barely blinked" after the failure of Amaranth because of the help provided
by J.P. Morgan and other institutions).
96. See Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 410.
97. Id. Furthermore, the San Diego pension filed a class action lawsuit against
Amaranth to recover its losses from the fund's collapse. See Alistair Barr, Amaranth
Tries to Have Pension Fund Suit Dismissed, MARKETWATCH, June 7, 2007,
available
at
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/amaranth-files-motiondismiss-pension/story.aspx?guid=%7B6D743FA9-5FAA-4B06-94C5-95E4A4C76
F95%7D (discussing the San Diego County Employees Retirement Association's
lawsuit against Amaranth and its officers to recover losses from its $175 million
investment).
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the need for regulation to ensure that a similar incident does not
98
happen in the future."
The massive failures of LTCM and Amaranth certainly increased
regulators' concerns over a hedge fund's potential to have a serious,
adverse impact on investor safety and market stability. Although a
major financial crisis was avoided when several major financial
institutions bailed LTCM and Amaranth out of their dismal situations,
the funds' effects on individual investors is obvious and disturbing,
with investors losing millions due to the failures. However, it is
impossible to determine the degree of devastation these massive hedge
fund failures would have had on the world's financial markets had
they not been averted.
III. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS THROUGH THE INVESTMENT
ADVISERS ACT OF 1940 AND THE "HEDGE FUND RULE"

A. History of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
The IAA was one of a series of acts enacted by Congress in
response to the stock market crash of 1929. 99 pecifically, these acts
were created to address the corruption and misuses in the securities
markets which led to the crash. °° Prior to the crash, Congress'
98. Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 410.
99. Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, as Amended (15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-l-80b-21), 5 A.L.R. FED. 246,
§ 2[a] (1970). The stock market crash of 1929 was one of the worst financial crises
in U.S. history and ushered in the Great Depression-the worst economic recession
in U.S. history. See Daniel, supra note 3, at 276-77 ("In a matter of three days, the
1929 stock market crash erased over $14 billion of stock capitalization; the total
market capitalization eventually dropped from $90 billion to $16 billion. To put this
into perspective, between 1929 and 1933, national personal income went from just
under $90 billion to just over $40 billion."). Essentially, the U.S. national income
fell approximately 15% in just a few days. Id. at 277. The crash was caused by a few
primary factors, including speculation, outstanding trading volume, short-selling,
and lax margin requirements. Id. Although there are some differences, one can see
the eerie similarities between the financial landscape preceding the stock market
crash of 1929 and the current landscape of hedge funds. See generally id at 274-96
(comparing the events leading to the stock market crash of 1929 to the current
concerns regarding hedge funds and concluding that hedge fund conditions differ
slightly).
100. See Korpela, supra note 99, § 2[a].
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primary view towards the securities markets was one of caveat
emptor. 10 However, the crash, and the abuses leading to it, resulted in
Congress adopting a radically different philosophy-one of "full
disclosure"-evidenced by the creation of the JAA.10 2 The IAA was
passed in reaction to a comprehensive study and report by the SEC
concerning, among other things, the post-depression demand for
unbiased investment advice, as well as the subsequent rise in
professional investment advisers.1 °3 The report indicated that certain
problematic issues were developing with these professional
investment advisers. 0 4 These new concerns included "protect[ing] the
public against malpractice by persons paid for advising others
concerning investment in securities," and "conflicts of interest
between investment advisers and their clients, resulting in
subconscious as well as conscious impediments to objectivity."' 1 5
Principally, the IAA was designed "to protect the public against
malpractice by persons paid for advising others concerning investment
'' 0 6
in securities."

B. Function of the IAA
Generally, the IAA gives the SEC authority to regulate investment
advisers.'0 7 The IAA requires non-exempt investment advisers to
register with the SEC and implements certain disclosure and

101.

Id. "Caveat emptor" is Latin for: "let the buyer beware." BLACK'S LAW
236, 1708 (8th ed. 2004). It is a legal maxim that purchasers buy at
their own risk. Id. In the context of financial investments, caveat emptor describes
the notion that the individual investor should be responsible for avoiding fraud or
scams. See Investopedia.com, Caveat Emptor, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
c/caveatemptor.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2008).
102. Korpela, supra note 99, § 2[a].
103. See Korpela, supra note 99, § 2[a]; Paul F. Roye, Director, Div. of Inv.
Mgmt., SEC, Remarks Before the Investment Counsel Association of America,
Atlanta (Apr. 6, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch361.htm.
104. See Korpela, supra note 99, § 2[a].
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (requiring advisers to register with the
SEC).
DICTIONARY
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regulatory requirements for those advisers. 0 8 These requirements
include: anti-fraud provisions, guidelines for marketing and
communications activities, requisite disclosure of financials and
disciplinary measures, mandatory recordkeeping practices, and
guidelines for an adviser's personal securities-related dealings.0 9
Registration provides the SEC with a reliable source of data--data
that is critical in detecting and deterring fraudulent activity." 0
The IAA has specific language defining who, exactly, is an
"investment adviser" for the purposes of the Act."' However, falling
within the definition of an "investment adviser" does not necessarily
require automatic registration with the SEC. 1 2 Among the various
exemptions provided in the IAA is the "private adviser exemption,"
which allows investment advisers to avoid registration if they are an
adviser "who during the course of the preceding twelve months has
had fewer than fifteen clients and who neither holds himself out
generally to the public as an investment adviser nor acts [as] an
investment adviser to any investment company registered under [the
Act].""' 3 Moreover, advisers may consider each hedge fund, trust, or
corporation they manage as one client for the purposes of the "private

108. Id.; GERALD T. LINS ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS:
REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE § 3:45 (2007).
109. See LINS ET AL., supra note 108, § 3:16. Despite these requirements, there
is no private right of action by individual investors in a hedge fund against the
investment adviser. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment
Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,756, 44,760 (Aug. 9, 2007) ("[Rule 206(4)-8] does not
create a private right of action.").
110. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("By keeping a
census of advisers, the Commission can better respond to, initiate, and take remedial
action on complaints against fraudulent advisers.").
11. The IAA defines an "investment adviser" as:
[A]ny person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value
of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business,
issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities ....
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (2006).
112. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. at 72,054 (stating that many advisers use the private adviser exemption
to avoid registration with the SEC).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006).
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adviser exemption." 114 Essentially, this enabled hedge fund advisers to
"manage large amounts of client assets and, indirectly, have a large
number of clients," even though they were unregistered.'5 As will be
discussed, the dramatic growth of private pooled investment vehicles,
primarily hedge funds, combined with the increasing number of
investment advisers who have avoided SEC registration by structuring
their funds to take advantage of exemptions like the "private adviser
6
exemption," has prompted increased regulation by the SEC. 1
C. The IAA as an Avenue for Hedge FundRegulation:
"The Hedge FundRule"
1. Summary of the Rule
In 1999, in response to the failure of LTCM, the President's
Working Group on Financial Markets submitted a report to Congress
recommending changes in hedge fund regulation and disclosure." 7 In
2003, following the Working Group's report, the SEC staff
investigated hedge funds and their advisers, and held a "Hedge Fund
Roundtable" in connection with the investigation." 18 Subsequently, in
September 2003, the SEC produced its own report focusing on the
issues and concerns with the growth of hedge funds and the activities
of hedge fund advisers."19 In response to the investigation, the

114. See id; Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund
Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,054-55 (stating that, for the purposes of the private
adviser exemption, the IAA "permitted advisers to count each partnership, trust or
corporation as a single client .... ).
115. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. at 72,055.
116. See id at 72,054-56; see also Paredes, supra note 21, at 976-77.
117. See generally WORKING GROUP, supra note 22.
118. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. at 72,055. Prior to requesting the investigation, the SEC was very
generally addressing its concerns with hedge funds. See id. The SEC requested that
its staff "develop information . . . and advise [it on] whether [it] should exercise
greater regulatory authority over the hedge fund industry." Id. The "Hedge Fund
Roundtable" was intended to develop in greater depth the proposals regarding hedge
funds, and included many participants in the hedge fund industry. See id.
119. See generally STAFF REPORT, supra note 24 (outlining the SEC staff's
findings, identifying concerns, and recommending regulatory measures to improve
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roundtable, and the report, the SEC proposed and adopted the 2004
Hedge Fund Rule. 120 Most significantly, the rule changed how
investment advisers to private funds must count clients: "For the
purposes of [the private adviser exemption] of the [IAA], [advisers]
must count as clients the shareholders, limited partners, members, or
beneficiaries (any of which are referred to hereinafter as an "owner")
of a private fund . .. ,,12 1 Essentially, the new rule "require[d] hedge
fund advisers to count each investor in a hedge fund, rather than only
the hedge fund itself, as a client for the purposes of the private adviser
22
exemption." 1
2. Implications of the Rule
As mentioned, prior to the Hedge Fund Rule, investment advisers
of hedge funds could rely on the private adviser exemption by
counting each fund as a single client.' 23 The Hedge Fund Rule
eliminated that option for investment advisers by requiring them to
"look through the fund to count each investor in the fund as a single
client for purposes of the registration requirement under the Advisers
Act." i24 Therefore, any investment adviser managing a fund that had
more than fifteen investors was now required to register under the
IAA. 125 The major implication of the rule was that "almost every

regulation and oversight of the hedge fund industry); see also Registration Under the
Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,055 (discussing
the staff report and stating the report confirmed and developed the SEC's concerns
regarding the hedge fund industry).
120. Pekarek, supra note 95, at 925 (discussing how, after the SEC reviewed
the findings from the 2003 staff report, it "adopted a revised investment adviser
registration Rule"). See generally Hedge Fund Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2
(2004), vacated, Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (requiring
specific methods for counting clients in hedge funds).
121. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a).
122. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. at 72,058.
123. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876 (stating that, prior to the Hedge Fund Rule,
"the Commission had interpreted [the private adviser exemption] to refer to the
partnership or entity itself as the adviser's 'client."').
124. Paredes, supra note 21, at 988.
125. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877 ("The rule had the effect of requiring most
hedge fund advisers to register by February 1, 2006.").
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hedge fund adviser in America would no longer be exempt and would
be potentially subject to the registration requirements,
based on the
26
[r]ule's more inclusive new definition of 'client."
3. Initial Opposition to the Hedge Fund Rule and the SEC's Response
The Hedge Fund Rule was one of the most controversial
regulatory schemes in recent history. 27 Various comment letters
opposing the new Hedge Fund Rule were presented in the SEC's
release. Their main arguments were twofold. First, if investment
advisers were required to register, they would be unwilling to engage
in the complicated investment strategies available to unregistered
investment advisers. 28 Second, the burdens and costs of registering
with the SEC "would make [hedge funds] less competitive, and would
impose barriers to entry preventing new hedge fund advisers from
starting their own hedge funds."' 129 Although the requirements of the
IAA certainly impose more of a burden on investment advisers, "[t]he
IAA does not impose a detailed regulatory regime."' 30 In response to
those opposing the Hedge Fund Rule, the SEC presented several
arguments as to why the registration of hedge fund advisers would not
"impose undue burdens on them or interfere significantly with their
operations." ' 13 1 The SEC argued that the success of registered
investment advisers demonstrates that registration and the extra
requirements that follow would not prevent advisers from using
126. Pekarek, supra note 95, at 926.
127. Id. at 932 ("The [Hedge Fund] Rule ignited one of the more widely
reported regulatory conflicts in recent market history, and included publication of
both Commissioner Atkins's and Glassman's dissents."); see also Paredes, supra
note 21, at 989 (discussing the criticisms of the Hedge Fund Rule, including: "(1) it
[would] drive hedge funds offshore; (2) its cost of compliance [would] erect entry
barriers that keep new funds from launching; and (3) it [would] chill hedge fund
managers form undertaking at least some new and innovative investment
strategies .... ); Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 404 ("[The Hedge Fund Rule]
quickly came under attack by hedge fund advisers, trade associations, and other
critics who were concerned about compliance costs and inefficiencies.").
128. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,060 (Dec. 10, 2004).
129. Id. at 72,063.
130. Id. at 72,054.
131. Id. at 72,059.
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complicated and inventive investing techniques. 32 Specifically, the
SEC presented a study suggesting that the performance of registered
and unregistered hedge fund advisers is relatively similar, and that
"[flive of the ten largest (and presumably most successful) hedge fund
advisers [were then] registered . . . under the Advisers Act."' 33
Further, although "[m]ore than 8,500 advisory firms that collectively
manage[d] over $23 trillion ... [were] registered under the Advisers
markets and were
Act[,]" they remained competitive in the financial
34
able to employ successful investing techniques. 1
4. Why the Hedge Fund Rule is Necessary
The SEC presented various reasons, still applicable today, why
the safety of U.S. financial markets and investors requires registration
of hedge fund advisers. First, the SEC needs "reliable, current, and
complete" data to facilitate analysis by SEC staff. 35 Second, although
the SEC does not have an "effective program that would provide [it]
with the ability to deter or detect fraud by unregistered hedge fund
advisers[,] ' 136 registration under the IAA would enable the SEC to
conduct examinations which could detect fraud and provide a
deterrent against it. 137 Third, registration would enable a screening
process through which the SEC could keep "fraudsters, scam artists
and others" from entering the hedge fund industry and engaging in
fraudulent activities.' 38 Finally, the SEC argued that adoption of
"compliance controls" and "compliance officers" would help detect
1 39
violations of the securities laws and potential conflicts of interest.

132. See id. at 72,060 (stating that arguments suggesting registration would
hinder advisers from engaging in their previous investment strategies are "refuted by
the experience of registered hedge fund advisers" who have experienced success
despite registration).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 72,061.
136. Id. at 72,059.
137. See id. at 72,061.
138. Id. at 72,063. The SEC was, and still is, concerned that such persons find
hedge funds appealing due to the lax registration requirements and their potential to
defraud investors. See id.
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The Commission acknowledged that it does not have the resources to
constantly regulate every investment adviser at all times and that
compliance officers would "serve as the front line" in detecting these
dangers. 140
On December 10, 2004, the SEC officially adopted the Hedge
Fund Rule, and many previously unregistered advisers were instantly
required to register by February 1, 2006.141 However, the Hedge Fund
Rule never took full effect. Within months of its adoption, the rule's
adviser in the Court of
legality was challenged by an investment
42
Appeals for the District of Columbia. 1

IV.

GOLDSTEIN v.

SEC: A DEFEAT FOR THE SEC

A. Summary of the Case
Shortly after its adoption, Phillip Goldstein, Kimball & Winthrop,
and Opportunity Partners L.P. (Goldstein) challenged the Hedge Fund
Rule in the D.C. Circuit Court. 143 Phillip Goldstein co-owned Kimball
& Winthrop, an investment advisory firm that was the general partner
144
and adviser of Opportunity Partners L.P., a hedge fund.
Specifically, Goldstein "challenge[d] the regulation's equation of
'client' with 'investor,"' or, in other words, the "look-through"
provision of the Hedge Fund Rule.' 45 Goldstein's main argument was
that, in adopting the Hedge Fund Rule, the SEC misconstrued the
"private adviser exemption" of the IAA. 14 6 The petition for review
was argued on December 9, 2005, and was decided on June 23,

139.

Id.; see also Antoszewski, supra note 3, at 403 ("[R]egistration would

require hedge funds to adopt compliance programs and submit to routine

examinations.").
140. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. at 72,063.

141. See id. at 72,054.
142. See generally Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
143. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 874.
144. Id.
145. Id.; see also Paredes, supra note 21, at 988 (stating that the rule required
the adviser to "look through the fund to count each investor.., as a single client for
purposes of the registration requirement").
146. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 878.
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2006.147 The court concluded that the Hedge Fund Rule was
"arbitrary," and that the SEC failed to show "how the relationship
between hedge fund investors and advisors justifies treating the
former as clients of the latter.' 48 Accordingly, the court vacated and
49
remanded the Hedge Fund Rule. 1
B. The Definition of "Client":Ambiguity and the SEC's
Authority to Define the Term
The court began by discussing the procedural background leading
up to the adoption of the Hedge Fund Rule and generally summarized
the rule. 5 ° The court then addressed the SEC's first argument that,
because the IAA does not define "client," the statute is "ambiguous as
to a method for counting clients."'' The court rejected this argument
and declared that there is no rule of law which states that a statutory
term is ambiguous if it lacks a specific statutory definition. 5 2 The
court reasoned that, in the same manner that defined statutory terms
are not automatically unambiguous, undefined statutory terms are not
automatically ambiguous. 153 Further, the court held that Congress has
"scarcely" authorized an agency to choose one of the many possible
definitions of an unclear statutory term."' Finally, the court held that
the "'words of the statute should be read in context, the statute's place
in the overall statutory scheme should be considered, and the problem
Congress sought to solve should be taken into account' to determine
' 55
whether the Congress has foreclosed the agency's interpretation.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.at 873.
Id. at 882, 884.
Id.at 884.
See id. at 877.
Id. at 878.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.(citing PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
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C. The Definition of "Client ". A Legislative Interpretation
Next, the court discussed the term "client" and whether Congress
intended to include investors, shareholders, limited partners, members,
and beneficiaries of hedge funds within the meaning of term. 56 The
court acknowledged an amendment to the IAA in 1980 that added the
following language: "For purposes of determining, the number of
clients of an investment adviser . . . no shareholder, partner, or
beneficial owner of a business development company . . . shall be
deemed to be a client of such investment adviser ....",7The court
stated that this amendment "could be seen as Congress's
acknowledgement that 'client' is ambiguous in the context of §
203(b)(3)."' 5 8 However, the court also acknowledged a 1970
amendment in which Congress appeared to take the view that
investment company entities are the clients of advisers, and not the
entities' shareholders. 159 Moreover, the court looked to another section
of the IAA defining "investment adviser" as "'any person who, for
compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either
directly .. as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities."" 60 The court noted that
the investment adviser does not directly advise the shareholders or
limited partners of the fund, but rather advises the fund itself.161 The
court referred to the investors as "completely passive," and concluded
that if the investment adviser is not advising each investor, then it
62
follows that each investor cannot be a "client" of the adviser.1
D. The Definition of "Client ": The Requirement
of an Adviser-Client Relationship
The court confirmed that the SEC has traditionally held the
court's view of the adviser-client relationship, and that the SEC stated

156. See id. at 878.
157. Id.

158. Id.
at 879.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.at 879 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1)).
See id.at 879-80.
Id.at 880.
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in a 1997 release that an adviser provides clients with "individualized
advice," and that an adviser "need not consider the individual needs ' of
63
the company's shareholders when making investment decisions."'
Also, the court recognized a 1985 release from which the SEC
promulgated a rule stating that, for purposes of the private adviser
exemption, a client "is the limited partnership [and] not the individual
partners," and that an adviser should regard the entire investment pool,
and not the individuals, as the "client." 164 Finally, the court
established that even the Supreme Court had "embraced a similar
conception of the adviser-client relationship,"' 65 envisioning the
adviser as providing his or her client with "personalized advice
attuned to a client's concerns."' 66 The court concluded that a fiduciary
relationship exists between the investment adviser and the fund, but
not between the adviser and the fund's investors.' 67 Therefore, the
court held that the SEC's interpretation that each investor within a
fund is the adviser's "client" "falls outside the bounds of
68
reasonableness."'
E. The Dofinition of "Client". Practical Reasons for
Not Considering All Investors "Clients"
Thereafter, the court addressed the practical reasons for not
considering each individual investor a client. First, the court referred
to section 206 of the IAA, which prohibits any registered or
unregistered investment adviser from "engag[ing] in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit
upon any client or prospective client."' 169 The court reasoned that if an
investment adviser were to owe this fiduciary duty to both the
individual investor and the fund, then the adviser would certainly be

163. Id. (construing Status of Investment Advisory Programs Under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 62 Fed. Reg. 15,098, 15102 (Mar. 31, 1997)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 208 (1985)).
167. Id. ("This type of direct relationship exists between an adviser and the
fund, but not between the adviser and the investors in the fund.").
168. Id. at 880-81.
169. Id. at 881 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2)).
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presented with conflicts of interest.' 70 Thus, the court concluded that a
71
client cannot be both the investor and the fund. 1
Further, the court noted that the relationship between investment
advisers and individual investors had not changed since the
implementation of the "private adviser exemption."' 72 Therefore,
although some of the reasons the SEC gave in favor of creating the
Hedge Fund Rule may have been valid, they were not adequately
justified by any change in the relationship between investment
advisers and investors. 173 The court concluded that, if the SEC
intended for there to be an adviser-client relationship between
investment advisers and the investors, then "the Commission should
have identified those characteristics and tailored its rule
accordingly."' 174 Regardless, the court seemed to suggest that the
unclear meaning of the term "client" and the method of counting
clients for the private adviser exemption are issues that should have
been left to Congress, not the75Commission, which lacks the authority
to interpret the term "client.'

1

F. The Court's Conclusion
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the
SEC's desire for more comprehensive hedge fund regulation is
reasonable, but stated that "[t]he Commission may not accomplish its
objective by a manipulation of [the] meaning [of 'client'].' 76 The
court ruled that the SEC's Hedge Fund Rule was arbitrary and
unreasonable, and, therefore, vacated and remanded the rule.1 77 As a
result, more than 1000 investment advisers who had registered with

170. Id.
171. Seeidat881.
172. See id. at 882 (stating that the relationship between the fund advisers and
the investors has not changed "over the years").
173. Id. at 882.
174. Id. at 883.
175. See id. at 883-84.
176. Id. at 882.
177. Id.at 881,884.
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the SEC in accordance with the Hedge Fund Rule were able to de178
register if they so chose.
V. RULE 206(4)-8: A RESPONSE TO GOLDSTEIN
A. Adoption of Rule 206(4)-8
The SEC's defeat in Goldstein left the future of hedge fund
regulation uncertain, and it was unclear how the Commission would
respond. 179 However, the SEC clearly intended to act.' 8 ° Shortly after
the Goldstein decision, Commissioner Cox stated that the SEC's
regulatory scheme concerning hedge funds was insufficient and that
the Commission needed to act quickly to address the defects left by
the decision.' 81 It appeared as though the SEC would either appeal the
court's decision or rewrite the Hedge Fund Rule. 182 However, the
Commission chose neither route and opted to abandon its push for
hedge fund registration altogether. 183 Instead, in 2007, the SEC
adopted a new antifraud rule, Rule 206(4)-8.184 The rule "prohibits
178. See LINS ET AL., supra note 108, § 3:4.50; Antoszewski, supra note 3, at
404, 406 (stating that over 1000 advisers had registered between April 2005 and
April 2006, and that, as of October 2006, 101 advisers had already de-registered).
179. See HAZEN, supra note 12, § 21.2[3]; Nathan J. Greene, SEC Proposes
Rules ProhibitingFraud by Investment Advisers and Creating a New Category of
Accredited Investor, 26 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES PO'Y REP. 1, 1 (2007)
(discussing how the Goldstein decision "raised questions regarding an investment
adviser's obligations to investors in pooled investment vehicles").
180. See Daniel, supra note 3, at 296.
181. Id.at 296-97.
182. HAZEN, supra note 12, § 21.2[3].
183. Id. ("The SEC's response to Goldstein was to abandon [its] attempt to
require registration under the [IAA].").
184. BARBASH & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 240. Rule 206(4)-8(a) states:
It shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice, or
course of business within the meaning of section 206(4) of the Act (15
U.S.C. 80b-6(4)) for any investment adviser to a pooled investment
vehicle to:
(1) Make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, to any
investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle; or
(2) Otherwise engage in any act, practice, or course of business that is
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[registered and unregistered] advisers to pooled investment vehicles
from making false or misleading statements to, or otherwise
defrauding, investors or prospective investors in those pooled
vehicles."'

' 85

The SEC proposed the rule in order to clarify the antifraud
provisions in the IAA. 186 Specifically, the SEC felt that the language
in Goldstein questioned the Commission's authority to enforce the
antifraud provisions of the IAA. 187 Prior to the adoption of the new
rule, section 206 of the IAA stated that registered and unregistered
investment advisers were prohibited from "engag[ing] in any
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud
or deceit upon any client or prospective client." 18 8 As discussed above,
Goldstein established that the "client" of an investment adviser is the
fund itself and not the investors in the fund. 189 Consequently, it
became unclear whether or not the SEC could bring enforcement
actions against an adviser for defrauding the individual investors of a
hedge fund-investors who are not considered clients of the

fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative with respect to any investor or

prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle.
Pooled Investment Vehicles, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(a) (2007). The SEC is
authorized by Congress in section 206(4) of the IAA "to adopt rules and regulations
that 'define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts,
practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."'
Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed.
Reg. 44,756, 44,757 (Aug. 9, 2007) (citing 15 U.S.C. 80b-6(4)).
185. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles,
72 Fed. Reg. at 44,756. See generally BARBASH & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at
240-44 (discussing the provisions of Rule 206(4)-8).
186. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment
Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,756.
187. See id.; BARBASH & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 240 ("Proposed Rule
206(4)-8 ...appears to be a response to a statement made by the Court in Goldstein

regarding the nature of the fiduciary duty of a hedge fund manager. In its decision,
the Court concluded ...

that an investment adviser ...

has a fiduciary obligation

only to the investment vehicle and not to the vehicle's investors.").
188. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (2006).
189. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Prohibition of
Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,756.
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adviser.19 ° Rule 206(4)-8 avoids this dilemma by prohibiting fraud
9
against "investors" or "prospective investors."' 1
B. Scope of the New Rule
Rule 206(4)-8 is larger in scope than other antifraud laws because
of its broad definition of "fraud," the rule's extension of liability to
unregistered investment advisers, and its language designed to protect
individual investors. The SEC, against the opinions of some
commentators, purposefully defined "fraud" broadly.' 9 2 Consistent
with this, Rule 206(4)-8 broadly prohibits an adviser from making any
false material statements or omissions and from employing business
practices that are "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."' 93 The
Commission's arguments as to the reasonableness of adopting such
broad language are twofold. First, the Commission asserts that
Congress gave it the authority to adopt antifraud rules that are both
general and flexible. 194 Second, the Commission reasons that
"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" conduct is easily-identifiable
because what constitutes such conduct is well-established within the
securities laws. 19 5 Additionally, the new antifraud rule extends
96
liability to both registered and unregistered investment advisers.'
The SEC constructed the new rule to include unregistered advisers
because of the large number of fraud cases involving them, and
190. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles,

72 Fed. Reg. at 44,756 ("As a result, it was unclear whether the Commission could
continue to rely on sections 206(1) and (2) of the [IAA] to bring enforcement actions

in certain cases where investors in a pool are defrauded by an investment adviser to
that pool."). As will be discussed, Rule 206(4)-8 does not create any private right to
action. Id. at 44,760.

191. Id. at 44,757 ("The rule clarifies that an adviser's duty to refrain from
fraudulent conduct ... extends to the relationship with ultimate investors .... ");
Greene, supra note 179, at 2 ("Rule 206(4)-8 would apply to both current and

prospective investors in the pooled investment vehicle.").
192. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles,
72 Fed. Reg. at 44,757.
193. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(a) (2007).

194. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles,
72 Fed. Reg. at 44,757.

195. Id.
196. Id. at 44,758.
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because the SEC believed it is critical to continue to act against
fraudulent advisers regardless of whether they are registered.1 97
Finally, the SEC structured Rule 206(4)-8 to protect investors and
prospective investors alike, rather than just the pooled investment
1 98

vehicles.

C. PooledInvestmett Vehicles
The Commission used a new term, "pooled investment vehicle,"
in adopting rule 206(4)-8.'99 A "pooled investment vehicle" is "any
investment company defined in section 3(a) of the Investment
Company Act [15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)] and any privately offered pooled
investment vehicle that is excluded from the definition of investment
company by reason of either section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the [Act]." 200
Thus, even companies relying on the Investment Company Act's
(ICA's) 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exclusions, which include hedge funds, are
considered pooled investment vehicles and are therefore implicated
under the broad antifraud provisions. 20 1 As with the IAA, hedge funds
rely on exclusions under the ICA to avoid registration under that
197. Id.
198. See id.
at 44,757. The SEC broadened the new rule to include "potential
investors" for the same reasons that Congress included "potential clients" within the
scope of sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the IAA. See id.
199. See id.
at 44,758.
200. Id. Subsection 3(a) of the Investment Company Act states:
(1) When used in this subchapter, "investment company" means any issuer
which(A) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to
engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in
securities;
(B) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing faceamount certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such
business and has any such certificate outstanding; or
(C) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing,
reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or
proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40
per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of
Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2006).
201. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment
Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,758.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007

33

California Western Law Review, Vol. 44 [2007], No. 2, Art. 7

622

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

Act. 2° 2

Section 3(c)(1) provides an exclusion for companies whose
outstanding securities are owned by 100 people or fewer and whose
20 3
issuer does not plan on making a public offering of its securities.
Section 3(c)(7) excludes from registration "investment companies that
do not make a public offering and whose securities are owned
exclusively by qualified purchasers. "204
The Commission's
employment of the term "pooled investment vehicles" extends the
breadth of Rule 206(4)-8 to cover funds relying on both the
exemptions of the ICA and those of the IAA, including hedge funds,
private equity funds, and venture capital funds.20 5
D. False or Misleading Statements, or Omissions
Rule 206(4)-8 prohibits investment advisers from making "any
untrue statement of a material fact or [omitting] to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, to any
20 6
investor or prospective investor in a pooled investment vehicle."
This requirement resembles provisions in other SEC antifraud laws;
consequently, it is possible that some fraudulent statements may
violate Rule 206(4)-8 in addition to other antifraud provisions.20 7
Also, Rule 206(4)-8 covers more instances of fraud than other
antifraud regulation, such as rule lOb-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, in that it includes "statements to investors in
the pool regardless of whether the pool is offering, selling, or

202. Daniel, supra note 3, at 262 (discussing the exclusions that hedge funds
rely on to avoid registration under the ICA and how avoiding registration permits
hedge funds to partake in activities otherwise prohibited by the Act).
203. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(l); Daniel, supra note 3, at 262.
204. Daniel, supra note 3, at 262; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)(A).
205. See generally Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled
Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,756 (Aug. 9, 2007) (using the term "pooled

investment vehicles" throughout).
206. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(a)(1); Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to
Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,758-59.

207. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment
Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,759 ("The provision is very similar to those in many of
our antifraud laws and rules that, depending upon the circumstances, may also be

applicable to the same investor communications.").
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redeeming securities."2 0 8 According to the SEC, the new rule prohibits
"materially false or misleading statements regarding investment
strategies . . . , the experience and credentials of the adviser ... , the
risks associated with ... the pool, the performance of the pool or other
funds advised by the adviser, the valuation of the pool . . . , and
209
"....
practices the adviser follows
E. Fraudulent,Deceptive, or Manipulative
Under Rule 206(4)-8, investment advisers are prohibited from
"engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of business that is
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative with respect to any investor or
prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle." 2 '0 The broad
language of this provision is derived from section 206(4) of the
IAA. 2 1 1 The language of Rule 206(4)-8 prohibits any fraudulent
action, as opposed to the more narrow provisions in other antifraud
laws which limit liability only to fraudulent statements. 2 12 The SEC
used this language so that the rule would be broader than the existing
antifraud provisions and protect against fraudulent conduct as well as
fraudulent communications. 2 13 Further, the Commission declined to
specify what conduct is considered "fraudulent," opting instead to
maintain the rule's broad construction in an effort to provide greater
2 14
protection to pooled investment vehicles' investors.

208. Id.; cf 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007) (stating that it is unlawful "[t]o
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any

security").
209. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles,
72 Fed. Reg. at 44,759.
210. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(a)(2).
211. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles,
72 Fed. Reg. at 44,759.
212. See id ("[T]he wording of this provision ... is designed to apply more
broadly to deceptive conduct that may not involve statements.").

213. See id ("[S]ection 206(4) itself specifically authorizes us to adopt rules
and prescribing . . . [conduct], and does not explicitly refer to
communications .....
214. See id.
defining
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F. No Scienter Requirement

Unlike other antifraud provisions found in the securities laws, the
Commission does not need to demonstrate that an adviser acted with
scienter in order to violate Rule 206(4)-8.25 Commentators voiced
concern over the lack of a scienter requirement, arguing that a
negligence standard would expand "fraud" beyond its original
meaning. 2 6 Also, some commentators went so far as to say that the
lack of a scienter requirement would reduce communications between
hedge fund advisers and investors, thereby diminishing the
transparency of the fund's investment activities and increasing the
likelihood that investors would make uninformed investment
decisions.217 The Commission responded with precedent authorizing it
215. See id. For a brief explanation on "scienter," see supra note 15.
216. See, e.g., E-mail from David A. Vaughan & George J. Mazin, Partners at
Dechert LLP, to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, SEC (Mar. 9, 2007), in SEC Proposed
Rules; 17 CFR Parts 230 and 275, Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain
Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment
Ve"icIles, Dec. 27, 206, in PRACTCNG LAw INST., CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE
145, 148 (2007) [hereinafter SEC PROPOSED RULES] ("Without [scienter], we

believe that the proposed rule would have the effect of creating both uncertainty on
the part of hedge fund advisers as well as the possibility of strict liability under Rule
206(4)-8 for innocent or minor violations .... ."); Letter from Patricia A. Poglinco &
Robert B. Van Grover, Attorneys at Seward & Kissel LLP, to Nancy M. Morris,
Secretary, SEC (Mar. 8, 2007), in SEC PROPOSED RULES, supra, at 93, 99 ("Under

the Proposed Rule, the Commission would theoretically be able to take enforcement
action against an adviser who, for example, made an unintended typographical error
in a routine email to an investor."); E-mail from Ricardo W. Davidovich et al.,
Attorneys at Tannenbaum Helpern Syracuse & Hirschtritt LLP, to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, SEC (Mar. 1, 2007), in SEC PROPOSED RULES, supra, at 83, 84

(commenting that, although investment advisers should be held accountable for not
using "reasonable care," to hold investment advisers "accountable for inadvertent
errors, including items that looking back over time may appear erroneous, even if
thought in good faith to be true when published, appears quite unfair and seems to us
to be a burden that is virtually impossible to meet"). Prohibition of Fraud by
Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,759.
217. See E-mail from David A. Vaughan & George J. Mazin, Partners at
Dechert LLP, to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, SEC (Mar. 9, 2007), in SEC
PROPOSED RULES, supra note 216, at 145, 148 ("As a consequence [of not having a

scienter requirement], hedge fund advisers may choose to provide more limited
information to investors .... This, in turn, would result in diminishing an investor's
understanding of and ability to evaluate potential investments and . . . discourage
meaningful, candid and informative discourse between fund advisors and
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to set forth prohibitions reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent
practices.218 Correspondingly, the SEC concluded that it has the
authority to broaden liability for fraud beyond the scienter
requirement because Rule 206(4)-8 is "reasonably designed to prevent
fraud. ' ' 219 Furthermore, the SEC reasoned that hedge fund advisers
should not be concerned with the rule's lack of a scienter requirement
because the rule does not create or modify 2any
fiduciary duty that is
20
not already required by other sources of law.
G. No PrivateRight to Action
The Commission clearly established that Rule 206(4)-8 "does not
create a private right of action." 221 Specifically, the SEC stated, "Rule
206(4)-8 does not create under the Advisers Act a fiduciary duty to
investors or prospective investors in a pooled investment vehicle not
investors.").

218. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles,
72 Fed. Reg. at 44,759 (construing United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673
(1997)). Specifically, the SEC opined that it is not restricted to the section 10(b)
requirement of scienter. See id. at 44,759-60.
219. Id. at 44,759. The SEC further stated that, "by taking sufficient care to
avoid negligent conduct, advisers will be more likely to avoid reckless deception."
Id.
220. Id. at 44,760 ("Rule 206(4)-8 does not create.. . a fiduciary duty... not
otherwise imposed by law. Nor does the rule alter any duty or obligation an adviser
has under the Advisers Act, any other federal law or regulation, or any state law or
regulation . . . . In most cases, the conduct that the rule prohibits is already
prohibited by federal securities statutes, other federal statutes ... , as well as state

law.").
221. Id. Even prior to the adoption of Rule 206(4)-8, the Supreme Court held
that, generally, individual investors do not have standing to bring civil actions
against investment advisers under the IAA. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23 (1979) ("[T]he Act confers no other private
causes of action, legal or equitable."); Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431
F. Supp. 1080, 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1980). The Act
specifically limits who can bring a private cause of action against an adviser to that
adviser's clients or potential clients, and the Goldstein court made it clear that
individual investors in a fund are not the considered "clients" of the adviser.
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006). However, it should be noted
that, in some situations, an investor may have "an implied right of rescission under
section 215 of the Act, which provides that contracts in violation of the Act are
void." HAZEN, supra note 12, § 21.4[2].

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007

37

California Western Law Review, Vol. 44 [2007], No. 2, Art. 7

626

[Vol. 44

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

otherwise imposed by law. Nor does the rule alter any duty or
obligation an adviser has under the Advisers Act . . "222 Therefore,
only the SEC, and not the investors, can bring criminal and civil
actions against an investment adviser who violates the antifraud
provisions of the IAA.22 3
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RULE 206(4)-8: Two STEPS BACK
AND ONE STEP FORWARD

A. Two Steps Back: Rule 206(4)-8 Is an Ineffectual
Response to Goldstein
1. Rule 206(4)-8 Fails to Fully Address the SEC's
Concerns Regarding Hedge Funds
The SEC's adoption of Rule 206(4)-8 is a weak response to the
Goldstein decision when considering the concerns the SEC presented
with its 2004 adoption of the Hedge Fund Rule.2 24 Specifically, Rule
206(4)-8 only partially addresses one of the SEC's three major
concernls-raudUlet

ctiitLy.

25

Thc new'v rue contains

no provisins

that would provide the Commission with a way to monitor
unregistered hedge fund advisers or illuminate who is investing in
hedge funds. In addition to fraudulent activity, the new rule does not
provide the SEC with any way to examine the investment techniques
that hedge fund advisers are employing-techniques that often require
excessive amounts of leverage and risk, possibly resulting in failure
even where no fraudulent activity is involved. For example, LTCM
and Amaranth were two of the largest fund failures in history, yet their
respective collapses were the result of over-leveraging, not fraud. 226

222. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles,
72 Fed. Reg. at 44,760.
223. See id. at 44,757 ("[T]he Commission may bring enforcement actions
under the Advisers Act against investment advisers who defraud investors or
prospective investors in those pooled investment vehicles.").
224. The SEC's reasoning behind adopting the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule is
discussed earlier in this Comment. See supra Part III.C.
225. See supra Part II.C.2.
226. History shows that over-leveraging, and not fraud, was responsible for the
largest hedge fund failures the U.S. has seen. See supra Part II.D. Randall
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However, both failures resulted in significant hardships for investors
and almost had a devastating impact on U.S. financial markets.227
2. Detecting FraudWithout Disclosure
The new rule may confirm and broaden the SEC's ability to bring
actions against fraudulent activity, but fails to provide any provision
that might increase the detection of fraud. In 2004, the SEC stated that
it does "not have an effective program that would provide [it] with the
ability to deter or detect fraud by unregistered hedge fund advisers"
because the Commission lacks "basic information about hedge fund
advisers and the hedge fund industry." 228 Rule 206(4)-8's broad
definition of fraud may certainly give the SEC authority to bring
actions for many kinds of fraudulent activity, 229 but does not improve
the SEC's ability to gather information in order to detect fraud.
Furthermore, the SEC was troubled that it had to "rely almost entirely
on enforcement actions brought after fraud has occurred and investor
230
assets are gone."
Rule 206(4)-8 fails to address this concern as well because the
rule does not increase the Commission's ability to collect relevant and
current information on the industry. 231 As a result, the SEC will
Steinmeyer, Director at the Washington D.C.-based Hedge Fund Association,
considers excessive leveraging dangerous because "it increases the chances of
[hedge funds] blowing themselves up." Gregory Bresiger, Some Are Wary of
Leverage, TRADERS MAGAZINE, Mar. 2007, available at http://www.traders
magazine.com/issues/20070315/2746-1.html. Steinmeyer believes that, "[flor the
undisciplined hedge fund, this is like giving the drug addict more access to drugs."
Id.
227. See supra Part ll.D.
228. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,059 (Dec. 10, 2004).
229. The SEC broadened its ability to bring actions against fraudulent advisers
by using vague wording to define what constitutes "fraudulent." See supra Part V.B.
The Commission also extended its authority to include unregistered advisers. See
supra Part V.B.
230. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. at 72,059.
231. Rule 206(4)-8 merely enlarges the scope of what types of activities may
be considered fraudulent and augments who can be held liable for fraudulent
activity. See supra Part V. The Rule fails, however, to implement any new
registration requirement, or any other method for collecting direct and current
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continue to lack the ability to conduct examinations of hedge fund
advisers, a critical element of investor protection.2 32 Ultimately, the
SEC's adoption of the new rule does not change the fact that, in most
situations involving a Rule 206(4)-8 violation, an enforcement action
will be brought only after fraud is reported to the Commission-and
fraud will probably only be reported after an institutional or individual
investor has been defrauded and the damage has been done.
Intuitively, it makes more sense for the Commission to first find a
method for illuminating the activities of hedge funds, and then for it to
broaden the definition of fraud so as to eliminate the malfeasance that
it has detected through that method. However, in adopting the new
rule, the SEC remains reactive; the Commission may have increased
its authority to reprimand advisers for fraud after-the-fact, but it fails
to prevent fraud, and its associated losses, from occurring in the first
place.
3. No Private Right of Action
As mentioned, the new anti-fraud rule fails to provide individual
investors with any private right of action. 2 Although the SEC asserts
that it is concerned with protecting investors,2 3 4 it fails to provide
individual investors with any explicit civil remedy by which they can
recover losses resulting from their investment advisers' fraudulent
activity. Rule 206(4)-8 does not change the reality that only the
Commission has the authority, civilly and criminally, to bring any
23 5
enforcement actions against fraudulent investment advisers.
Therefore, as long as deceitful investment advisers can evade
detection by the SEC, they will avoid liability for their actions.
However, if individual investors had standing to bring actions
against investment advisers, there would be greater detection and

information on the hedge fund industry. Registration Under the Advisers Act of
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,059.
232. Id. at 72,059, 72,061 (stating that investment adviser examinations are "a
key part of [the Commission's] investment protection program").
233. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles,
72 Fed. Reg. 44,756, 44,760 (Aug. 9, 2007).
234. See supra Part III.C.
235. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment
Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,757.
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deterrence against fraudulent activity. First, the addition of private
individuals and institutions monitoring fraudulent behavior would
dramatically improve the detection of fraud. With a private right of
action, private organizations, such as law firms, would have an
incentive to monitor the activities of investment advisers. Under some
circumstances, these private legal institutions may have more
resources than the Commission, and therefore may be better suited to
detect fraud than the SEC. Consequently, those investment advisers
who would otherwise avoid detection by the SEC alone would more
likely be exposed through a combination of SEC and private
monitoring. Second, investment advisers participating in deceptive
practices would more likely be deterred from defrauding investors if
they knew that they were being monitored by private institutions in
addition to the SEC, and that both could bring an action against them.
The knowledge that any investor, institutional or otherwise, law firm,
or fund could bring legal actions against investment advisers would
greatly discourage advisers from engaging in fraudulent practices.
Unfortunately, similar to the SEC's enforcement of the new antifraud
rule, the lack of transparency in the hedge fund industry would likely
render it difficult for even private institutions to detect fraud among
unregistered advisers.
B. One Step Forward:Although It Falls Short of the
Hedge Fund Rule, Rule 206(4)-8 Is a Step Towards
IncreasedInvestor and Market Safety
Despite falling short of the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, Rule 206(4)-8
may increase investor safety to some extent. Most importantly, the
rule confirms the SEC's authority to bring antifraud actions against
investment advisers who defraud individual investors or potential
investors, a capacity that was questioned by the Goldstein court. 236 It
is essential that the Commission have unquestioned authority to act
against fraudulent activity. If its authority were unclear, it would only
provide greater ability for deceitful advisers to defend their actions.
236. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment
Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,756-57 (discussing how the Goldstein opinion left some
uncertainty regarding the SEC's authority to bring enforcement actions against
fraudulent investment advisers, but how the new rule clarifies the uncertainty
surrounding the SEC's authority).
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Additionally, the new rule's broad definition of fraud provides the
SEC with a more flexible interpretation of what types of activities
may be considered fraudulent.237 Although antifraud provisions
existed within securities laws prior to the new rule, they were fairly
narrow in scope. 238 For example, prior to Rule 206(4)-8, the SEC
could only bring actions for fraudulent adviser communications and
disclosures. 239 The new rule authorizes the Commission to bring
actions for a much broader variety of fraud.24 ° Moreover, under the
new rule, the SEC's ability to bring enforcement actions for fraudulent
activity is no longer limited by a scienter requirement, effectively
expanding fraud to include negligent activity. 24' An adviser can no
longer argue that he or she did not have the required state of mind to
defraud because it is enough that the adviser perpetuated an activity
that is fraudulent in nature. 242 Finally, the rule applies to all investors
and potential investors, and to advisers of all pooled investment
vehicles, registered or unregistered.243
In summary, Rule 206(4)-8 gives the SEC broad enforcement
authority against almost any type of fraud, by any investment adviser,
any I,evciI of "investor. The
lommission's
new and
p.e
ted against
nwaU
IbbI
11IK %-OI
I~axo
Lau
la
.F. ,.UL.

237. See supra Part V.B (discussing the scope of Rule 206(4)-8).
238. Although the language of Rule 206(4)-8 is similar to that of Rule 1Ob-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act, it differs in that Rule 206(4)-8 does not require a
specific statement or disclosure by an investment adviser. See Greene, supra note
179, at 2 (commenting that Rule 206(4)-8 is broader than Rule lOb-5, and that "the
proposed rule will not be limited to statements or other disclosure and will apply to
any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative conduct").
239. The language in the antifraud provisions of the IAA prior to the adoption
of Rule 206(4)-8 limited the activities in which fraud could be found to the "use of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or
indirectly." See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006). The new rule eliminates this confine. See
Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 44,757.
240. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles,
72 Fed. Reg. at 44,757 (stating that the Commission has defined "fraud" more
broadly than some commentators would have liked, and that its purpose for doing so
was to "prohibit all fraud on investors in pools managed by investment advisers");
Greene, supra note 179, at 2.
241. See supra Part V.F.
242. See supra Part V.F.
243. See supra Part V.B-C.
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improved definition of fraud is certainly a step in the right direction
towards hedge fund regulation. However, many of the enforcement
benefits that the new rule brings are hamstringed by the SEC's
remaining inability to detect fraudulent activity within the hedge fund
industry. Thus, the SEC must consider proposing a rule that would
offer the type of transparency that the now-vacated Hedge Fund Rule
once provided.
C. Revisiting the SEC's Concerns: The Next Step
It is highly likely that the Commission is not finished addressing
hedge fund regulation. It is possible that the adoption of Rule 206(4)-8
was the first, measured step in a series of steps towards increased
hedge fund regulation and disclosure. Nonetheless, the SEC's next
step should center on transparency within the hedge fund industry.
Transparency would protect investors, both within hedge funds and
within the markets generally, for two main reasons. First, it would
allow the SEC to more efficiently monitor the activities of hedge fund
investment advisers. As the Alliance for Investment Transparency
(AIT) so eloquently stated, "[t]he lack of transparency with respect to
the market activities of hedge funds exacerbates the risk to the
financial markets because regulators and others charged with
overseeing those markets are left in the dark ...

; leaving regulators

unable to see a potential crisis on the horizon."244 Illuminating the
activities of hedge funds would allow the Commission to be proactive;
the SEC could see a potential crisis in advance and work to prevent it.
Second, transparency would allow individual and institutional
investors to make more informed investment decisions. As Randall
Steinmeyer declares, "[h]edge fund regulation will work if it
accomplishes increased transparency, increased performance
background information, and adequate disclosure." 245 He further states
that such transparency and disclosure would legitimize hedge fund

244. Statement of the Alliance for Inv. Transparency to House Fin. Servs.
Comm. Hearing on "Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk: Perspectives of the
President's Working Group on Financial Markets" (July 11, 2007), at 1, available at
http://www.investmenttransparency.org/documents/AIT. Statement.House.Hearing.0
71107.pdf [hereinafter Statement of the AIT].
245. Hedge Funds' Notoriey: Fact or Fiction?,supra note 22, at 68.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007

43

California Western Law Review, Vol. 44 [2007], No. 2, Art. 7

632

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

investing in the minds of investors. 24 6 Clearly, the Commission should
refocus its efforts on hedge fund regulation by concentrating on
increasing transparency within the industry through mandated hedge
fund registration.
Some have suggested that increased regulation should be achieved
by limiting the leverage that a fund can employ, 247 or by limiting the
types of investors that can invest in a given fund.248 However, without
the ability to examine hedge funds, it would be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to enforce any specific regulation until after a
violation of that regulation has occurred. The SEC's ability to monitor
the hedge fund industry is the critical element in preemptively
enforcing any regulation, and the most obvious and accessible way to
increase the Commission's ability to monitor hedge funds is through
249
mandatory registration.
Disclosure within the hedge fund industry is exactly what the
Hedge Fund Rule was designed to achieve. As discussed, one of the
reasons that the SEC sought to mandate registration under the Hedge
Fund Rule was that it lacks information on the hedge fund industry,
"and [therefore] must rely on third-party data that often conflict and
may be unreliable. ' '250 Consequently, the SEC adopted the Hedge
Fund Rule and its compulsory registration because they allow the
Commission to examine the conduct of hedge fund advisers.2 5 Such
examinations "permit [the SEC] to identify compliance problems at an
early stage, identify practices that may be harmful to investors, and

246. Id. at 69.
247. See, e.g., Daniel, supra note 3, at 298-99 (arguing that one solution to the
hedge fund problem would be for the government to limit the leverage that funds
employ through either stricter margin requirements or though direct limitations).
248. See, e.g., Natali, supra note 3, at 131 (discussing how the SEC could
"limit the types of investors permitted to invest in hedge funds," including
restricting certain institutional investors' ability to invest in unregistered hedge
funds); Daniel, supra note 3, at 307-08 (commenting that the SEC could limit
pension funds and other institutional investors from investing, even to a certain
percentage, in hedge funds).
249. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,059 (Dec. 10, 2004).
250. Id. at 72,059, 72,061.
251. Id. at 72,061 ("Registration under the Advisers Act enables us to conduct
examinations of the hedge fund adviser.").
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provide a deterrent to unlawful conduct., 252 The registration of all
hedge funds is necessary if the Commission is going to succeed in
proactively regulating the hedge fund industry.
Moreover, registration of hedge funds alone-without any other
specific regulations as to how funds may invest, or who can invest in
funds-may be enough to prevent systemic loss. Hedge funds can be
beneficial to U.S. markets; their flexible and unfettered trading
activities provide the "smooth operation of financial markets and the
accuracy of securities prices, upon which investor confidence and the
integrity of securities markets depend., 253 Additionally, "[t]he U.S.
Federal Reserve, SEC, and IMF have all recognized the reality that
hedge fund trading activity often improves financial market pricing
efficiency and, in many instances, serves to increase liquidity."254
Hence, any regulation that restricts the types of activities in which
hedge funds can engage or that limits who can invest in these funds
may hinder the hedge fund industry, thereby causing U.S. financial
markets to forego the benefits of hedge fund trading. However, a
registration-alone approach to regulation would both deter misconduct
and enable the Commission to identify and prevent misconduct before
it can adversely impact the market. Further, a registration-alone
approach would not inhibit a hedge fund adviser's ability to employ
the funds' legitimate but distinctive trading strategies.255 Although
registration would have some minimal requirements, 256 it would only
hamper an investment adviser's activities if those activities are
prohibited. If an adviser is legitimately conducting his or her
operations, there should be minimal opposition to registration.

252. Id.
253. Paredes, supra note 21, at 1003.
254. Pekarek, supra note 95, at 958.
255. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. at 72059 ("[R]equiring hedge fund advisers to register ... will [not]
impose undue burdens on them or interfere significantly with their operations.").
256. These requirements may consist of certain obligations that come with
registration under the IAA, including guidelines for marketing and communications
activities, requisite disclosure of financials and disciplinary measures, mandatory
recordkeeping practices, and guidelines for an adviser's personal securities related
dealings, among other things. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. For more
information on the specific requirements of the IAA, see generally LINS ET AL.,
supra note 108, at ch. 3.
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Therefore, the Commission's next step should be towards
implementing mandatory registration of all hedge fund advisers under
the IAA. The SEC's first attempt at preventing hedge funds from
taking advantage of the IAA exemptions that enabled them to remain
unregistered failed when the Goldstein court vacated the Hedge Fund
Rule.257 However, this must not be the end of hedge fund registration.
Currently, there has been little progress in addressing hedge fund
registration and transparency.258 Congress has introduced bills
requiring registration, but they are having trouble reaching the Senate
floor. 259 Thus, the Commission must find an alternate means for
requiring registration, whether through implementation of some
administrative rule, or by extensively lobbying the Legislature to take
action.
VII. CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this Comment is to provide an overview
of the current state of affairs concerning hedge fund regulation.
o
Additionally, this Comment promotes the ida th th regisa+on+;
hedge fund advisers will provide the necessary transparency into the
hedge fund industry. A lucid hedge fund industry is the first step
towards alleviating the SEC's concerns over the systemic risks and
risks to investors posed by hedge funds. "[E]nhancing transparency in
the markets and disclosures by all market participants will produce a
more efficient market that is both fairer and less prone to instability or
dislocation. Transparency in the financial markets is one of the
26 0
bedrock principles that.. .is essential to the integrity of the markets.,
Regrettably, the SEC's response to Goldstein, Rule 206(4)-8, fails to
provide any disclosure into the hedge fund industry. Furthermore,
257. See supra Parts III.C, IV (discussing the rationale behind the adoption of
the Hedge Fund Rule and the reasons that the Goldstein court vacated the rule).
258. See HAZEN, supra note 12, § 21.2[l] ("The SEC's response to Goldstein
was to abandon [its] attempt to require registration under the [IAA].").
259. See Pekarek, supra note 95, at 959-60 (discussing how a recent hedge
fund registration bill was unable to get past the House Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises).
260. Statement of the AIT, supranote 244, at 2.
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SEC's current focus on the implementation of specific regulations, as
evidenced by the adoption of Rule 206(4)-8, will not likely provide
any transparency into the industry. In fact, specific restrictions will
likely cripple the industry and may hurt U.S. markets by preventing
advisers from employing the investment techniques that distinguish
hedge funds from other investment vehicles, techniques that provide
certain benefits to financial markets. 261 Therefore, the SEC should
refocus on a registration-based approach towards regulation.
Registration will provide transparency to the hedge fund industry and
illuminate any misconduct therein while minimally affecting an
adviser's ability to employ innovative and unique investing activities
that benefit U.S. markets.
Alfred C. Tierney*
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